为适应电力市场参与主体多元化发展态势，解决多虚拟电厂(virtual power plant, VPP)利益冲突问题，提出一种包含配电网运营商(distribution system operator, DSO)、虚拟电厂运营商(virtual power plant operator, VPPO)及用户聚合商(user aggregator, UA)多层架构的混合博弈策略，支撑多 VPP 的协同优化。首先，通过聚合光伏产消者、电动汽车充电站、综合能源负荷等多种灵活性资源形成 UA 集群；其次，面向 DSO、VPPO 以及 UA 的层级能源交易及 UA 主体间的能源交易，构建了“主从博弈- 主从博弈-合作博弈”的多层混合博弈模型；最后，利用二分法、Karush-Kuhn-Tucker 条件结合交替方向乘子法对上述模型进行求解。算例研究表明，所提出的多层混合博弈策略使光伏产消者 UA 与电动汽车充电站 UA 的运行成本分别降低了 4.5%和15.3%；同时，在 DSO 动态定价机制的引导下，系统运营商总收益提升了 2.7%。该策略能够有效均衡多方利益诉求，优化各运营主体间的能源交易及效益分配机制。

To address the challenges of diversified participants in the electricity market and resolve conflicts of interest among multiple virtual power plants (VPPs), this paper proposes a three-layer hybrid game strategy involving the distribution system operator (DSO), virtual power plant operator (VPPO), and user aggregator (UA) to support collaborative optimization of multi-VPP systems. First, a UA coalition is formed by aggregating various flexible resources, including photovoltaic prosumers, electric vehicle charging stations, and integrated energy loads. Next, a 3-layer hybrid game model is constructed, encompassing hierarchical energy transactions among DSO, VPPO, and UA, as well as peer-to-peer energy trading among UA entities, structured as a "Stackelberg game - Stackelberg game - cooperative game" framework. Finally, the proposed model is solved using the bisection method, Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, and the alternating direction multiplier method. Case studies demonstrate that the proposed multi-layer hybrid game strategy reduces the operating costs of the photovoltaic prosumer UA and the electric vehicle charging station UA by 4.5% and 15.3%, respectively. Meanwhile, guided by the dynamic pricing mechanism of the DSO, the total profit of the system operators increases by 2.7%. This strategy can effectively balance the interests of multiple stakeholders, optimizing the energy trading and benefit allocation mechanisms among different operators.