PDF(2549 KB)
PDF(2549 KB)
PDF(2549 KB)
计及电价风险的负荷聚合商双层优化购电策略
Bi-Level Optimizing Power Purchase Strategies for Load Aggregators Considering Electricity Price Risks
随着可再生能源占比的持续增长与负荷中心电网峰谷差日益显著,分布式资源的开发与利用已成为研究热点,催生了产消者及负荷聚合商等新兴主体的出现。鉴于各利益主体拥有差异化的优化目标,构建了以负荷聚合商作为售电主体参与电力市场的双层优化模型。首先,引入产消者需求响应机制,形成主从博弈框架并利用Karush-Kuhn tucker(KKT)条件,将双层模型的下层目标及约束整合至上层,实现统一求解。其次,引入条件风险价值(conditional value at risk, CVaR)方法以量化电价不确定性对负荷聚合商购电策略的风险影响。最后,通过实证算例分析得出:该机制能有效激励用户侧可调资源参与系统灵活性调节,促进负荷聚合商与产消者间的双赢合作格局。
With the continuous growth of the proportion of renewable energy and the increasingly significant peak-valley difference in the load center grid, the development and utilization of distributed resources has become a research hotspot, which promotes the emergence of new entities such as producers and consumers and load aggregators. In view of the different optimization objectives of each stakeholder, this paper constructed a bi-level optimization model with the load aggregator as the electricity seller to participate in the electricity market. Firstly, the demand response mechanism of producers was introduced to form the master-slave game framework, and Karush-Kuhn tucker (KKT) conditions were used to integrate the lower level goals and constraints of the two-level model to the upper level to achieve a unified solution. Secondly, the conditional value at risk (CVaR) method was introduced to quantify the risk impact of electricity price uncertainty on the power purchasing strategy of load aggregators. Finally, the empirical example analysis shows that the mechanism can effectively encourage the user side adjustable resources to participate in the flexibility adjustment of the system, and promote the win-win cooperation pattern between the load aggregator and the producer and consumer.
负荷聚合商 / 产消者 / 主从博弈 / Karush-Kuhn tucker(KKT) / 条件风险价值(CVaR)
load aggregator / producer and consumer / master-slave game / Karush-Kuhn tucker(KKT) / conditional value at risk (CVaR)
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The large-scale penetration of renewable energy sources poses significant challenges to the stable operation of power systems. Driven by double uncertainties on both the supply and demand sides, demand response resources based on terminal flexible loads need to be explored. Considering the load differentiation characteristics of different types of users, multitype load aggregators based on cooperation and win-win were introduced. Flexible dispatching of the power system was performed based on the complementary characteristics of the heterogeneous load response behaviors. Moreover, each load aggregator was assigned the dual status of a carbon trading integrator to enter the carbon trading market. A carbon trading model based on a reward-punishment ladder was constructed using the electricity load forecasting method to allocate carbon emission quotas for a system free of charge. Based on this, to minimize the sum of the operating costs of a cooperative alliance of multiple load aggregators, a pre-day optimization model of the interaction and cooperation among multiple aggregators was developed and solved. The Shapley value method was introduced for the cooperative game, and the cost was shared according to the contribution of each participant to the operation of the cooperative alliance. The results show that the overall and individual operational costs and the carbon emissions of the alliance are significantly reduced under the cooperative operation mechanism. |
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